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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: THE STRUGGLE FOR
FEDERAL SUPREMACY
William B. Lawless*
I believe that the mass of Americans rightly feel that no good
will come to them from any side in a war of abstract ideologies. The
way of life of the American is practical, hard-headed and concrete.
It is not made of what Justice Holmes once called "pernicious abstraction." Its distinguishing ideology is that it has no "ideology"
.except to get results.'
Robert Houghwout Jackson, in defining the American way of life, reflects
a penetrating self-analysis and summarizes his basic approach to judicial review.
With this outlook, Attorney General Jackson was appointed to the United
States Supreme Court in 1941 to fill the place left vacant by Harlan Fiske
Stone upon his ascendancy to the position of Chief Justice. His appointment
came at a time of political unrest and international tension. Bar and press were
skeptical, indeed cynical, of "The Roosevelt Court." The days were wrapped
in talk of defense, rearmament, neutrality, lend-lease. Just as a new relationship
had been begrudgingly assumed between the United States and allied nations
abroad, so too there was at home and before the Court a similar rearrangement
between the American and his government. It was, in the words of the newly
appointed Justice, "a change in the fundamental relation of the federal government toward the governed, which has come so quickly that we have not
recognized its significance." 2
It is the object of this article to examine some of the Supreme Court
decisions of Justice Jackson, to show to what extent Jackson shaped this "change
in fundamental relation," and to demonstrate how many of his decisions sought
to enlarge the federal sphere of influence in the American society. Such an
examination may be timely because the segregation cases and the recent decisionin the Tennessee reapportionment case dramatize the persistent trend to "expand
the influence of the Federal Courts as instruments of social change."' The
jurist from Jamestown contributed to that trend with the vigor of a frontier
federalist, in language tart, majestic and convincing.
The New Federalism
Mr. Justice Jackson viewed the United States in terms of nationhood, in
opposition to a patchwork of states. Indeed he could never be charged with
taking the 10th amendment! Profoundly influenced in his thinking by the
English temper and the English approach to law, he seemed eagerly disposed
to pattern both the American bar and its legal procedure after the British so
* A.B., LL.B., LL.M.; Justice New York Supreme Court; member New York Bar.

1 This statement by Justice Jackson is reprinted in Ranson, Associate Justice Robert H.

Jackson, 27 A.B.A.J. 478, 481 (1941).
2 Jackson, The Bar and the New Deal, 21 A.B.A.J. 93 (1935). (Address delivered by
Robert H. Jackson before the Association of American Law Schools, December 28, 1934).
3 N.Y. Times, March 27, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 4.
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far as the American constitutional process would allow.4 But because England
is a unitary government, at least in its internal affairs, application of the English
approach oft times requires a totally national frame of reference- which the
states' rights concept is unwilling to yield. Nevertheless Jackson sought to
expound a law which was singularly federal and American, and to those under
this law he stressed the rights of the federal citizen.
This drive also gave impetus to Jackson's desire for uniformity of law
among the states, and where it was lacking, a federal court, not too tightly
drawn by Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins,5 would order its decisions precisely, even
mechanically, for sake of that uniformity. With him these were the corollaries
of the New Deal, the new relation of the American and his government.
Impressed by English uniformity and the colonial American federalists, Jackson's
opinions show his trend to a neo-federalism.
In United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,6 the majority of the
court held, through Mr. Justice Rutledge, that the United States could not
recover money damages from the Oil Company tortfeasor for loss of services
Jackson's extrajudicial writings and addresses point up this characteristic. E.g. (1)
I would favor a movement in the direction of the British system (of a
unified bar) - without, however, entertaining any wish that evolution in
that direction be unduly forced or any delusion that even an approximation
of their excellent system can, under American conditions, be accomplished.
Jackson, Compulsory Incorporationof the Bar from the County Lawyer's Viewpoint, 4 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 316 (1926) ; (2)
Compared with the dignity, simplicity and sincerity of a British trial, the
tone of the average American trial is decidedly low. Some of wide publicity resemble in dignity and intellectual effort the hog calling contests
that are popular at county fairs.
Jackson, Advocacy as a Specialized Career, 7 N.Y.U. L. REv. 77 (1929); (3) After expressing
his distrust of American Administrative law, Justice Jackson said: ". . . In England, however,
the administrator is never out of reach of Parliament, which has a continuing supervision and
can make sure that he uses his power with sense and moderation." Jackson, Lawyers Today:
The Legal Profession in a World of Paradox, 33 A.B.A.J. 24 (1947); (4) See also his dissent
in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Jackson's most illuminating explanation of his view of the Erie
rule appears in his concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FederalDeposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) where he says:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie v. Tompkins . . .
that "There is no federal general common law," to deny that the common
law may in proper cases be an aid to or the basis of decision of federal questions. In its context it means to me only that federal courts may not apply
their own notions of the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except "where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States
(so) require or provide." Indeed, in a case decided on the same day as Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, Justice Brandeis said that "whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two states is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either State can be conclusive."
Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U.S. 82, 110 (1937). Jackson, at another place in his opinion
said:
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that
of each state wherein law suits happen to be commenced because of the
accidents of service of process and of the application of the venue statutes.
It is found in the federal constitution, statutes or common law. Federal
common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the
traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the
sources of the common law in (nondiversity) cases such as the present.
D'Oench, supra, 471-2. See also Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A.J.
609 (1938).
6 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
4
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and medical expenses of a United States soldier disabled by Standard's negligence. In the absence of a controlling statute, Jackson invoked what amounted
to a reacceptance of a federal common law rule in order to justify the government's right to recovery. He reasoned, with an eye to the English approach:
The law of torts has been developed almost exclusively by the
judiciary in England and this country by common law methods.
With few exceptions, tort liability does not depend upon legislation.
If there is one function which I should think we would feel free to
exercise under a Constitution which vests in us judicial power, it
would be to apply well established common law principles to a case
whose only novelty is in facts. The courts of England whose scruples
against legislating are at least as sensitive as ours normally are, have
not hesitated to say that His Majesty's Treasury may recover outlay
to cure a British soldier from injury by negligent wrongdoer and
the wages he was meanwhile paid. Attorney General v. Valle-Jones

(1935) 2 K. B. 209. I think we could hold as much without being
suspected of trying to usurp legislative function. 7
While the English case cited in Jackson's opinion is factually in point,
the jurist overlooked the basic difference in constitutional structure between
the two nations, and he avoided discussing the central problem presumably
resolved in Erie v. Tompkins. Instead he emphasized "the judicial power" as
a base for readopting a federal common law.
He relied on federal supremacy outright in United States v. County of
Allegheny.8 In that case the federal government contracted with the Mesta
Machine Company and agreed to supply machinery to its plant in Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, provided the machinery be used exclusively to manufacture field guns for the defense effort. Under the contract the Government
agreed to reimburse Mesta for certain taxes it paid including local property
assessments. The County of Allegheny increased the assessment of the Mesta
plant by the value of the newly installed, government-owned machinery. In
the litigation between Mesta and the County over the increase, the Government
intervened in Mesta's behalf and denied tax liability under its contract setting
up its own sovereign immunity. The court of last resort in Pennsylvania nevertheless affirmed the increased assessment and the United States brought appeal
to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Jackson held that for tax purposes title to
the machinery was in the United States, and because of the supremacy clause?
of the Constitution, the Government was immune from the tax. He reasoned
that historically and constitutionally there was no room for the localities to
impose either retaliatory or compensatory taxation on government property
interests.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented from the majority on grounds that the
question was purely a state question and the governmental immunity was not
as broad as Jackson's opinion would indicate. Justice Roberts dissented and
objected to the majority's refusal to accept Pennsylvania law as its Supreme
Court defined it to be. He felt the decision should rest on a nonfederal ground.
7

Id. at 318.

9

Article VI, clause 2.

8 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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a. National Commerce
That Justice Jackson would jealously guard interstate commerce from the
not infrequent inroads of state legislation first appeared in Duckworth v.
0 decided shortly after his appointment
Arkansas,"
to the Court. He concurred
with Chief Justice Stone when the majority held that an Arkansas statute
requiring a permit for the transportation of intoxicating liquor through the
state was not violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution but Jackson
qualified his approval of Stone's result saying: "I would rest the decision of
the constitutional provision applicable only to the transportation of liquor, and
refrain from what I regard as an unwise extension of state power over interstate commerce."" At another place in his concurring opinion he lamented
that the decision "adds another to the already too numerous and burdensome
state restraints of natural commerce and pursues a trend with which I would
have no part."1 2
Following this view he consistently rebuffed state action which intruded

upon national commerce. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations
Board,' he struck down a state attempt to regulate the labor relations of foremen
and employers where Congress had already undertaken to deal with the relationship through machinery provided in the National Labor' Relations Act, and he
dissented from an opinion sustaining the constitutionality of a New Jersey tax
on foreign corporations maintaining storage facilities for goods in transit in
that state.' 4
Jackson's untiring demand for a national commerce uninhibited by state
action was pointed up once again in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond."
Hood & Sons, a distributor of milk in Massachusetts, operated three milk
receiving plants licensed under New York regulation. The company purchased
raw milk in New York, weighed, tested and shipped much of it from the
receiving plants in New York to Boston for resale. Hood applied to the New
York Milk Commission for a license to open an additional plant at Greenwich,
New York. The Commissioner refused the license on the grounds that its issuance
would reduce the supply of milk available for New York consumption, and
further because it would result in destructive competition in a market already
adequately served. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Commissioner's
right to deny the license. From its determination appeal was brought to the
Supreme Court. Jackson, writing for the majority, ruled that as applied in
the Hood case, the New York milk control law violated the commerce clause
of the Constitution of the United States. He admitted that the production and
distribution of milk were so intimately related to public health that need for
regulation was apparent but he reasoned that there is a deeply rooted distinction
between the power of the state to shelter its people from menaces to their health
10

11

12
13
14
15

314 U.S. 390 (1941).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 402.
330 U.S. 767 (1947).
331 U.S. 70, 91 (1947).
336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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and its lack of power to retard commerce. He relied on Justice Cardozo's
opinion in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 6 another milk case, which held
that the state might not promote its own economic advantage by curtailment
of interstate commerce. Critics of the opinion concur with Justice Black that
the record on appeal was inadequate for such a summary holding especially if
the decision were to turn on a quantitative appraisal of a state's interference
with interstate commerce.
Clearly when two conflicting constitutional interests collided, one represented
by the state's right to police power and health regulation, and the other a federal
demand for free commerce, federal authority prevailed.
b. Federal Jurisdiction
Nor was Mr. Justice Jackson hesitant in extending the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to allow" a wide choice of forum within the federal orbit. Mlutual
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co." questioned the constitutionality of
the 1940 attempt by Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to citizens of the
District of Columbia and other territories of the United States. The legislation
attempted to reverse a policy dating to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in 1805
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not open the federal district courts to citizens
of the District of Columbia since they were not "citizens of a state." Jackson
held for a divided court that the congressional extension was valid. He declined
to overrule Marshall's opinion in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey' s to the extent
that it held the District of Columbia not to be a state within the meaning of
article III of the Constitution, but reasoned ingeniously that power to legislate
for the District (article I, section 8) permitted Congress to open any and all
federal courts to citizens of the District. By treading this path he managed to
arrive at an obviously desirable result and at the same time superficially preserve
Marshall's questionable decision in Hepburn. In adopting this line of reasoning
it is not unlikely that Jackson was influenced by a provocative article cited in
the Government's brief as amicus curiae, advocating constitutional affirmance
of the new right for residents of the District of Columbia."
Jackson's rationale -supported
only by Black and Burton- met with
sharp reproach from both Rutledge and Murphy who joined Jackson's result
on other grounds. Rutledge, writing for Murphy and himself, scored the wisdom
of Marshall's view in the Hepburn case. He thought that in writing that case
16 294 U.S.511 (1935).
17 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
18 2 Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805).
19 Rathvon & Keefe, Washingtonians and Roumanians, 27 NEB. L. REv. 375, 379 (1948)
cited in the Attorney General's brief at pp. 24, 45 and 50. They said:
The preponderance of decided cases to the contrary notwithstanding we
believe that the 1940 amendment broadening diversity jurisdiction can be
upheld as constitutional on these three "grounds, each sure if the other fails:
1. By revising the concept that a court must be wholly legislative or
wholly constitutional and that the two types of jurisdicion may not be exercised by one court.
2. By finding that the grant of judicial power is not limited to Article 3.
3. By interpreting Article 3, Section 2 more broadly so that citizens of
territories and the District of Columbia are included within its provisions.
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the "master's hand ...
faltered" and he predicted Jackson's approach would
ensnarl the District courts in contradictions and complexities that had evolved
from the Hepburn holding. The minority likewise divided. Chief Justice Vinson
and Justice Douglas agreed with Rutledge that confusion would follow Jackson's
view and held it too high a price to pay for opening the courts to Columbians.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, agreed with his fellow dissenters
to the extent that they upheld the validity of Marshall's early view.
Jackson's rationale in Tidewater is appealing because it reached a desired
result, but closer scrutiny opens it to question. This is true because of the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in O'Donoghue v. United States.2" It was
there decided that the District Court for the District of Columbia is a "constitutional" court and for that reason the salaries of its judges could not be
reduced without offending article III, section 1 of the Constitution. If it is
true that the District Court is a creature of article III, and this has not been
denied, then it is difficult to see how Congress could legislate its growth under
article I.
Jackson replied that Congress has already given constitutional courts
jurisdiction beyond article III without judicial challenge in the matter of
claims against the United States and in bankruptcy cases. He pointed out that
federal jurisdiction over actions in connection with bankruptcies and reorganizations stems from the article I powers of Congress. But Frankfurter and
Rutledge answered this defense by showing that claims against the United
States were "controversies to which the United States shall be a party" according to the phraseology of article III, section 1, and the article I power merely
made bankruptcy a conventional federal question whereas the District courts were
controlled exclusively by article III. Unusual as it is in the history of the Court,
Mr. Justice Jackson won his point although five justices opposed his reasoning.
We have said that Jackson allowed a wide choice of forum within the
federal orbit in keeping with the broad scope of the national judicial system.
This point is demonstrated in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,2 wherein he
concurred separately with the majority view that permitted the widow of
a railroad employee, a resident of Tennessee, to prosecute her claim under the
Federal Employers Liability Act in a Missouri District Court although the
deceased was a resident of Tennessee, fatally injured in that State and all of
the witnesses resided there. Defendant-employer maintained places of business
in both Missouri and Tennessee. The suit was obviously brought in Missouri in
the hope that a metropolitan jury would award more liberal damages. Although
Justice Jackson admitted that the widow was "shopping" for her judge and
jury, and that the practice was not favored by the judiciary, he reasoned that
Congress "could not have intended (to prohibit) the relatively minor additional
burden to the interstate commerce from loading the dice a little in favor of the
workman in the matter of venue." 2 He further tried to justify his result by
saying that Congress had come to think of a forum as a "private matter between
20 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
21 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
22 Id. at 708.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON

litigants."2 This result was later nullified by Congressional action and Court
decision."
c. Full Faith and Credit
As broad as Justice Jackson conceived the range of the federal judicial
system to be, he indicated - particularly in conflict of laws decisions arising
under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution- that while the 14th
amendment assures federal citizenship, the American is at the same time a
citizen of the state wherein he resides.25 He urged the view that the citizen
and the corporation have some fixed place within the federal system where he
or it really belongs for purposes of fixing legal status and determining by whom
they shall be directly governed. In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,8 he urged
the Court to go further and hold that Minnesota had the exclusive right to tax
a fleet of airplanes which operated interstate but maintained its "home port"
in that state. He even suggested that such a concept of state citizenship may
be required by the 14th amendment. This does not mean to say that he pegs
the state localization of the citizen on a higher level in his hierarchy of values.
On the contrary he leans toward federal supremacy but he regrets that the full
faith and credit clause of the constitution has frankly not worked to build a
respected framework of extraterritorial recognition of state law. He felt that
local policies and balance of local interest dominate the application of the
federal requirements. He suggested that this is strange since the states have less
to fear from a strong federal influence in dealing with full faith and credit
than with most other constitutional provisions. He thought that anything taken
from the state by way of freedom to deny faith and credit is thereby added to
the state by way of a right to exact faith and credit for its own acts. But because
the states have failed to understand this basis of exchange, Justice Jackson
apparently felt that it became the duty of the Supreme Court to adjust the
interstate legal relationship. These views were more concretely applied in the
Justice's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina."
In the first Williams case the majority of the Court held that a divorce
granted by a Nevada Court on a finding that one spouse was domiciled in
Nevada, must be respected in North Carolina, where Nevada's finding of
domicil was not questioned. Two Nevada divorce decrees were procured by
residents of North Carolina who moved to Nevada long enough to meet the
six week domicil requirement of that state. A decree was entered without in
personam jurisdiction of the other spouses. Thereafter they married each other
and returned to North Carolina to resume their status as citizens of their native
state. Williams and his second wife were convicted of bigamous cohabitation
by a North Carolina court which refused to recognize the Nevada decrees.
23

Id. at 706.

24 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1958) as interpreted in Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1
(1950); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949).

25

JAcKSON,

FULL

FAITH & CREDIT, THE LAWYER'S

CLAUSE

OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1945) (4th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered December 7, 1944).
26 322 U.S. 292 (1944).

27 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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Justice Jackson vigorously attacked the majority view which he said nullified

the power of each state to protect its own citizens against dissolution of their
marriages by the courts of other states which sanction an easier system of
divorce. He stated:
It is not an exaggeration to say that this decision repeals the
divorce laws of all the states and substitutes the law of Nevada as
to all 28marriages one of the parties to which can afford a short trip

there.

He assailed the majority decision on two general grounds: (1) the Nevada
divorce decrees deprived the spouses remaining in North Carolina of due
process of law for the court admittedly had no personal jurisdiction over them,
nor did Jackson admit that the Nevada court had in rem jurisdiction which the
majority acknowledged; (2) Williams and friend failed to establish a domicil
in good faith in Nevada, for they obviously intended to return to North Carolina.
To support his first contention, Jackson recalled that on the oral argument
of the case counsel defending the Nevada decree suggested that the res of marriage existed in duplicate, one for each party to the marriage. If so, queried
the Justice, what happened to the res that remained behind in North Carolina?
Further, he attacked treating marriage as a res and felt that it was a contract
between parties - in this case the Nevada court had only one party to the contract before it and by proceeding it did not meet the due process requirement.
Secondly, he denied a bona fide domicil. On this score he made the cryptic
remark that "The only suggestion of a domicil within Nevada was a stay of
about 6 weeks at the Alamo Auto Court, an address hardly suggestive of per29
manence."
He argued that Nevada might as readily prescribe a six day requirement
to establish domicil, and logically, it could require only a filing of a declaration
of intent. On the whole issue he felt that the majority view fitted in with the
Court's trend to break down the rigid concept of domicil as a test of the right
of the state to deal with the fundamental relations of its citizens.
Justice Jackson distinguished between the internal and external power of
Nevada in entering her divorce decrees. He admitted their finality within the
State but felt it was quite another thing for Nevada to dissolve the marriages
of North Carolinians. He thought the Court had slighted the due process clause
in its preoccupation with full faith and credit, and he argued that it was futile
to examine the full faith question before first establishing the existence of jurisdiction itself. But since there was no jurisdiction in Nevada over spouses remaining in North Carolina, there could be no occasion for requiring extraterritorial
recognition of the Nevada decrees. Again we see him striving for federal uniformity of law and developing a state base in which to ground it. He denied
that the chain of state divorce policy is only as strong as its weakest link. Relying
on his bona fide resident test for determining domicil, the weak-link states are
re-enforced by the federal requirement that a state have a legitimate concern
with the matrimonial status of the parties who seek to rely on its decrees.
28 Id. at 312.
29 Id. at 321.
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Although Justice Jackson held the first Williams decision in low esteem,
nonetheless his sense of duty to precedent led him to apply it. In Magnolia
Petroleum Company v. Hunt,"° such a test appeared. Hunt, a resident of
Louisiana and employed there, was injured in Texas in the course of his employment. He recovered workmen's compensation from Magnolia under a Texas
statute by the terms of which the award was "final" and res judicata. Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the majority, held that under the full faith and credit
clause, the Texas compensation award precluded Hunt's recovery in Louisiana
against his employer under Louisiana law- even though the Texas award was
set-off against the later Louisiana recovery. Jackson concurred with the majority
in a separate opinion saying:
Overruling a precedent always introduces some confusion and the
necessity for it may be unfortunate. But it is as nothing to keep on
our books utterances to which we ourselves will give full faith and
credit only if the outcome pleases us. I shall abide by the Williams
case until it is taken off our books, and for that reason concur in the
decision herein. 31
To this observation Justice Douglas retorted in defense for the earlier
product of his pen:
I do not agree with the view that the full faith and credit clause
is to be enforced "only if the outcome pleases us." We are dealing
here with highly controversial subjects where honest differences of
opinion are almost certain to occur. Each case involves a clash between the policies of two sovereign States. The question is not which
policy we prefer; it
is whether two conflicting policies can somehow
32
be accommodated.
But Justice Douglas was not to have the last word on the problem of full
faith and credit presented in the first Williams case. The Williamses returned
in 1945.
The second Williams case to a large degree justified Jackson's earlier view. 3
In the second case, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority which Jackson
joined, held that the state of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded recital in the record of a court of a sister state. He wrote:
As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon
which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a
party to the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but
seriously affected by it has a right, when asserting its own unquestioned
authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial
34
fact.
On this reasoning the majority affirmed the North Carolina conviction of
Williams for bigamy because it was based on a North Carolina jury finding that
the accused parties had not established a bona fide domicil in the State of Nevada
30 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
31 Id. at 447.
32 Ibid.
33 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
34 Id. at 230.
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and, therefore, the divorce decree was a nullity. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote
the majority opinion in the first Williams case, dissented and relied on Justice
Black's opinion that the majority was here grounded on refusal to recognize
what another state had apparently regarded as adequate domicil, and on the
further reasoning that the Constitution does not "measure the power of state
courts to pass upon petitions for divorce."
The Jackson-Douglas rift on the questions of the full faith and credit clause
and the disagreements evidenced in the Williams case reappeared."5 The question arose whether a New York decree awarding respondent monthly payments
for her maintenance and support in a separation proceeding survived a Nevada
divorce decree later granted petitioner. The husband discontinued payments
subsequent to entry of the Nevada decree of divorce taking the stand that it
superseded the earlier New York separation provisions. Douglas, writing for
the majority, held that although the Nevada judgment was valid to dissolve the
marriage, it lacked jurisdiction to terminate the husband's liability under the
New York separation. Justice Jackson dissented vigorously claiming that if the
Nevada judgment was to have full faith and credit, it should have the same
effect as a similar divorce decree would have, had it been procured in New
York. He felt strongly that the court had reached a "Solomon-like" conclusion;
that the Nevada decree was half-good and half-bad under the full faith and
credit clause. "Good to free the husband from the marriage, .. .not good to
free him from its incidental obligations. 36
Jackson's objection to ex parte divorce decrees probably reflected the influence of New York law which has long given maximum recognition to foreign
decrees where the defendant appeared and minimum recognition where the
defendant neither appeared nor was served personally within the jurisdiction.
These cases demonstrate Justice Jackson's view of federal supremacy in matters touching national commerce; his desire to open federal courts to residents
of the District of Columbia; his approval of a flexible federal venue and his
demand for a fixed base of citizenship within the federal orbit. In sum they
again suggest his approval of a well-ordered but extensive national government.
Through his opinions he expressed credence in the central theme of the New
Deal and defined that theme as a fundamental change in relation between the
government and the governed, allowing to government a broader sphere of
national management for benefit of the governed but, at the same time, pre.serving to the governed their traditional personal liberties. His ability to strike
a balance between the expansive strides of federal government and yet preserve
the guarantees of American citizenship -in spite of the war powers, was perhaps his greatest single contribution to the Court he served so well.

35 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). See also Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
36 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 554 (1948).

